The distribution of water resources is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Distribution systems link water generation to its end-use. Standard economic analysis overlooks the interaction among these micro-markets -generation, distribution and end-use. We compare water allocation when there is market power in each micro-market. These outcomes are compared with benchmark cases -social planning and a competitive business-as-usual regime.
Introduction
Water management has been called the most significant challenge of the 21 st century. Most water is publicly provided by vertically integrated state utilities because the distribution of water is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Various studies have shown that public ownership and management of water have led to serious inefficiencies including "weak incentives to reduce costs, implement marginal cost pricing or maintain water systems" [Cowan and Cowan (1998) ].
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Water reform has often meant the creation of water markets at the downstream end where water users may buy and sell water as well as the management of generation and distribution facilities.
However, market behavior downstream is closely linked to the upstream generation and distribution of water. Market power may occur at the supply, distribution or end-use stage. The organizational structure in any given micro-market affects the performance of the system as a whole. The focus of this paper is the integrated analysis of the microstructure of such markets in which the overall effect of market power in any one segment of the market can be examined.
There is a significant body of literature that suggests the existence of market power in the generation, distribution, and end-use of water. Agricultural water districts in California buy water from the government and the Bureau of Reclamation and often wield monopsony power in the water market. 3 Global water companies such as Vivendi of France operate in over 100 countries and are essentially distribution monopolies that supply water to users. Giant agribusiness firms as well as producer cooperatives in the U.S. which by law are exempt from anti-trust regulation, organize production and have market power in the output market. 4 In this paper we develop a model that examines how market power in water generation, distribution, and end-use affects social welfare, equilibrium output and price, volume of service and grid size.
We compare these stylized institutions to two polar cases: social planning and a competitive regime characterized by market failure in distribution. The main policy implication is that given 2 They suggest that the record of governmental provision in the water sector is "extremely poor." In developing countries, tariffs are routinely set below cost recovery levels, often less than half the water supplied is paid for by beneficiaries, and large segments of the population are not connected to the grid. 3 About 70% of global water use is in the farming sector [International Year of Freshwater (2003) ]. 4 The historical role of these organizations in developing water resources and civilization in the arid Western US has been vividly described by Reisner (1986) .
increasing returns to scale in distribution, the introduction of water markets need not automatically lead to efficiency. The choice of a second-best institutional regime may depend upon the precise characteristics of the microstructure of the water market.
In our spatial framework, water is generated at a given location and sold to a utility that maintains the distribution network. This utility supplies water to firms located along the distribution system, which in turn use it to produce output. The analysis focuses on market power in generation, distribution, and in the final product market. We show that under competition in distribution and an end-use monopoly, less water is likely to be provided in the aggregate. Both regimes result in a higher end-use price, lower output, and a smaller-thanoptimal service area. To produce the same aggregate output, the monopoly uses less water than the competitive regime.
Simulations with stylized data suggest that institutions with market power in generation and enduse generate significantly higher welfare than the distribution monopoly and business-as-usual regime. However, the distribution monopoly maximizes service area coverage. Using the same amount of water, it services twice the geographical area than an output cartel. If the policy objective is maximizing the service area and bringing more consumers into the grid, the distribution monopoly may be preferred even though it generates lower welfare. It may be the regime of choice in water scarce regions. The analysis suggests that proposals for intervention in water markets must be informed by the choice of an appropriate institutional delivery system.
Which institution performs better depends upon the conditions in each of the micro-markets and their interlinkages through technology.
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Section 2 describes a vertically integrated water model with distribution. In section 3, we examine the specific institutional alternatives and compare their characteristics. Section 4 provides an illustration. Section 5 concludes the paper. 5 Not recognizing these technology linkages may result in unanticipated policy failures. Electricity privatization in California failed partly because of inadequate appreciation of the technological features of electricity transmission, which led to partial privatization and the consequent failure of privatized markets to induce investment in increasing transmission capacity [Wilson (2002) ].
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The Model
For ease of exposition, we develop the model for water distribution in farming, which is by far the largest user of water. 6 The insights hold for other commodities and services distributed over space. The basic structure of the model is similar to that of Chakravorty, Hochman, and Zilberman (1995) , here referred to as CHZ. We extend their framework by modeling market structure at the generation, distribution and end-use markets. 7 Consider a simple one-period model in which water is generated at a point source, e.g., a dam or a diversion in a river or a groundwater source. Let ) 0 ( z denote the amount of water generated at this location at
. If there are multiple sources, then the cheapest source is selected for each marginal unit generated. This water is sold to the canal authority which manages the distribution system.
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Generation and distribution may be operated independently or by one vertically integrated firm.
The canal company supplies water to identical users located at distance x over a continuum on either side of the canal, where x is measured from the source. Let r be the opportunity rent per unit area of land. Without loss of generality, let the constant width of land be unity. Each firm occupies a unit of land, so that the number of producers is proportional to the length of the canal.
Let the price of water charged by the canal company at any location x be ) (x p w and the quantity delivered be ) (x q . The fraction of water lost in distribution per unit length of canal is ) (x a .
Let
) (x z be the residual water in the canal at location x. Then
where the right-hand side sums the water delivered and lost in distribution at x. The residual flow 6 Distribution losses in farming are sometimes of the order of 50% of the water carried. 7 Their focus is on water use and technology choice by firms located spatially under alternative water-pricing mechanisms. We simplify their framework by abstracting from endogenous choice of conservation technology by firms, which complicates the analytics without yielding much new insight. 8 Water may be generated at a remote location and transported through barges or supertankers. Transport of water over large distances is common.
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of water in the canal must decrease with x, 0 ) ( ≤ ′ x z . Let X be the canal length to be determined.
defined as the annualized capital and operation and maintenance expenditure in distribution, which varies with location. Let the reduction in the distribution loss rate be given by ))
where ) (⋅ m is assumed to be increasing with decreasing returns to scale in k, i.e., 0
Firms located along the canal use water ) (x q to produce output
The production technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect to all other inputs. Let Y denote aggregate output given by
Resource Allocation by an Integrated Water Utility
Let the social planner's total cost of producing a given output level Y be ) (Y C , which can be expressed as the sum of the cost of water generation, distribution and land rent:
The planner minimizes the cost of producing a given output level Y by choosing ) (x q , ) (x k and values for X and ) 0 ( z as follows: 
, and 4(c)
The corresponding Lagrangian is Fig. 1 (8) says that it increases away from the source because of the cost of distribution. As established by CHZ, water use, output, and investment in distribution decrease away from the water source. An increase in the shadow price of water from head to tail causes a decrease in water use by firms. The marginal product of water (
increases with distance so output falls. The shadow price increases, but the volume of water carried by the distribution system decreases at a higher rate because of water withdrawals by firms and distribution losses. The net effect is a decrease in the "value" of the residual water flowing in the system, causing a decrease in distribution investment. At the boundary of the grid
and rearranging, yields
which implies that net benefits from expanding service by one unit must equal the opportunity rent of land, r. A lower r would imply a greater service area measured by X. 
ensures that a positive aggregate output will be produced. 
Alternative Regimes for Water Management
We now discuss the systemwide effects of alternative institutional mechanisms for the generation, distribution and end-use of water. If government intervention is prohibitively costly or infeasible (e.g., when the government is weak), then this socially optimal allocation may not be achieved. The alternative institutions we consider may emerge through reform or because of some evolutionary process that we take as given. A polar extreme may entail total decentralization in which a utility may supply water but the distribution of water is delegated to individual firms at each location. Because of increasing returns to scale each firm will compete and attempt to free-ride by underinvesting in distribution. We compare the social planner and the competitive solution above with three regimes with market power in either water generation, distribution or end-use. These are: a water-users association, which has market power in water generation and maintains the distribution system while charging each firm the true marginal cost of supplying water [Dosi and Easter (2003) ]; a canal operator that owns the generation facility (or buys water competitively) but is a monopoly seller of water to individual firms; and finally, a vertically integrated utility that buys water competitively or owns the generation facility, supplies water at competitive prices to firms, and buys the output for sale in the product market, where it may have market power.
13 These three cases highlight the effect of market power in the three micro-markets -water generation, distribution, and end-use -on welfare and resource allocation in the entire system. 
a. Competition in Distribution (CID)
This is the benchmark model that aims to capture the situation when there is no centralized distribution of water. 14 Firms withdraw water from a rudimentary distribution system and make private investments in distribution taking investment by other firms as given. As we show below, this causes the usual free-rider problems since firms do not accrue all the benefits from their investment in distribution. Water losses in distribution will be higher than under social planning.
For convenience, we assume that individual firms can engage in trading in water rights and thus pay spot shadow prices for water at each location. 15 Equivalently the water agency charges firms the marginal cost of water at each location and uses the proceeds to maintain a basic distribution system. Both of these arrangements yield equivalent outcomes. Each firm is atomistic in the enduse market, which is modeled as a competitive industry.
Individual firms act competitively by buying water from the water utility at its marginal cost at source. 16 Their investment in distribution ( ) k x is chosen assuming other firms' investment as given. Let firm i be located at distance x. It receives its allocation of water
. If the price of water at source charged to the firm is ) x ( λ and the loss rate of water is ) x ( a , then the value of water at any location in the interval
is the water carried at location l for delivery to firm i.
and takes aggregate investment by
where
future work. 14 Wade (1987) provides evidence on the gradual breakdown of a canal system in South India because of corruption and rent-seeking. Poor maintenance of canals induces losses from leakage as well as theft. Often the upstream beneficiaries steal water from the canals, depriving downstream users of their entitlements. Ray and Williams (2002) discuss the incentives for water theft and cooperation along a canal. 15 An alternative model with uniform pricing over space, e.g., a water charge in the form of a land or output tax, has been examined by CHZ. Our assumption of marginal cost pricing is conservative, since uniform pricing is less efficient and will lead to greater inefficiencies.
Firm i chooses i k to satisfy the above condition. Adding over all i, the condition for investment
Compare this condition to socially optimal investment in distribution given by (7) 
, i.e., the shadow price of water at source as well as aggregate water stock is higher in the optimal model. Then at locations close to the source, we have 
which as in (13) yields
. For the CID case, output price equals the constrained marginal cost of producing output with sub-optimal distribution.
b. The Water Users Association (WUA) -an Input Monopsony
The Water Users Association is a mirror image of the monopolist in that its market power lies in the market for water generation and it is a price-taker in the output market. This represents a setting in which the number of buyers of water is small. We compare the Water Users Association with the output cartel and show how market power in the input and output markets may differentially affect resource allocation. An example of such an "input cooperative" are California water districts which acquire and store water and allocate it to users. "These quasigovernmental entities can appropriate water, construct reservoirs and distribution systems, and enter into contracts with federal or state local suppliers" [Congressional Budget Office (1997) ].
The biggest serves more than half a million acres. They contract to buy surface water supplies from either the state or the Bureau of Reclamation. "Water is allocated in large blocks controlled 16 Each firm buys water at cost at the source and chooses investment in distribution.
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by strong local districts. They influence the terms under which virtually all of the water in California's Central Valley is used" [National Research Council (1992) ]. In other states, the most common type of water supply organization is a mutual water (or ditch) company.
"Mutuals" are non-profit cooperative organizations that generally sell stocks or shares to members. These organizations determine retail water prices. They recover their costs by charging prices that may or may not be independent of the quantity used. More importantly, retail prices may be much higher than what the districts pay to suppliers such as the Bureau of Reclamation [Congressional Budget Office (1997) ].
The water-users association is a monopsonist that buys (0) z units of water to maximize total net benefits given by
is the derived demand for aggregate water for the association. The necessary condition is:
is the solution to the above problem (see Fig. 2 ). The WUA allocates this aggregate level of service ) 0 ( z w efficiently in production. Given the imperfect input market, the cost of producing aggregate output may be higher than for the social planner. The WUA is competitive in the output market so that price equals marginal cost of output.
c. The Canal Operator -a Distribution Monopoly (DM)
The canal operator owns the canal, buys water from the generator and sells it as a monopolist to individual firms along the canal. 17 The operator manages the distribution system. is the derived demand for water at each location given by 
is the marginal cost of output for the operator.
d. The Producer Cartel (PC) -An Output Monopoly
The producer cartel organizes water distribution and production. It may either own the generation facility, or equivalently, buy aggregate water at marginal cost. It supplies water at 18 Enron's efforts to set up markets for trading water are described in Smith and Lucchetti (2000) . Their total cost of producing Y is identical since both allocate internal resources efficiently, including in distribution. Hence the monopoly cost function is also given by
. Let p p be the output price for the cartel.
e. Comparison of Alternative Institutions
We first compare the cost functions for each regime. This can be stated as: Proof: See Appendix. ▪ Given its market power in the end-use market, the cartel will price its product higher. However, the level of aggregate service (quantity of water) provided by the cartel is also lower, and service is restricted to a smaller area than for the social planner. This is true even though the cartel is not a monopoly either in the market for water generation or distribution. The cartel provides more water at each location than in the model with poor distribution, because it enjoys higher water 15 efficiencies.
The relationship between the water users association and the social planner is shown in Fig. 2 .
The aggregate marginal net benefit when water is distributed optimally is given by
The WUA chooses the aggregate stock using (16) and pays the supplier price w p which is lower than the optimal price ) 0 ( * w λ and reflects its monopsony power. Aggregate water use is smaller than optimal. Aggregate output and grid size will also be lower than optimal. It is not clear if its output is lower or higher than the cartel or the CID regime. This depends on the specific characteristics of the input and end-use markets and the cost of distribution. If the cost of water generation is relatively elastic (flat
), then the WUA may have a smaller degree of market power in the input market. Its behavior will be closer to that of the social planner. If the generation cost is inelastic, water use will be significantly below optimal, and grid size will be smaller.
Which regime may be a preferred second-best outcome? If the factor market is relatively elastic, as may happen in a region with abundant water resources, the buying price of water will be low even though the aggregate water use is lower. Thus, by (8), the price of water paid by a firm at any location will also be relatively low. This will mean a higher output at each location. If the returns from distribution investments are high, then the marginal benefit from using a larger stock of aggregate water is likely to be high (see Fig. 2 ) leading to a relatively flat marginal benefit curve. In that case monopsony power in the input market will lead to a significant shrinking of the service area. If end-use markets are elastic, as in the case of an export market, the cartel may perform better than other second-best alternatives since deadweight losses in the retail end are likely to be lower. On the other hand, in regions where distribution losses are relatively low (e.g., less porous soils) or the returns from distribution investments are small (high construction or maintenance costs relative to the cost of water), 22 a CID regime might be an acceptable substitute for costly deadweight losses in an institution with market power. Even with market failure in distribution, a low maintenance competitive system may outperform a 22 In this case, the Nash Equilibrium investment at each location may be close to the optimal.
privatized system with market distortions. This may also happen if both input and output markets are relatively inelastic.
An important issue is the transition from a status quo distribution system (CID) to one with market power. If the CID regime were replaced by a producer cartel, it is not clear whether aggregate delivery of water would increase. But in order to produce the same level of output, water allocation would be more intensive, leading to a shrinking of the grid. Thus, moving from CID to an output cartel producing the same aggregate service will mean increased delivery at each location but a smaller grid. Imperfect competition in both water generation and the output market may mean an even smaller size.
The reform process could be facilitated by a proposed distribution of surplus from generation and distribution of water. However the set of firms ex ante and ex post of reform may be different. For instance, the CID regime may be replaced upon privatization by a cartel, which may shrink the number of firms serviced by the project. Ownership shares could be allotted to beneficiaries according to some neutral criteria, such as historical use. They could be traded, in which case, the price of the shares equals the marginal cost of water. If the ex post supply of water is lower than ex ante, then the number of shares traded will decline, and the utility may buy back and retire surplus shares. Firms which were in the market before but do not receive water ex post, may sell their shares and exit the industry.
An Illustration
This section presents a simple illustration of the various institutional alternatives using typical cost and demand parameters for the Western United States. The purpose is to show that the differences in welfare and resource allocation across the various models may actually be quite significant. Firm demand for water is derived from a quadratic production function for California cotton 23 in terms of water q such that a maximum yield of 1,500 lbs. is obtained with 3.3 acre-feet of water, and a yield of 1,200 lbs. with 2.2 acre-feet [Hanemann (1987) 
so that from (3), A rising long-run marginal cost function for water supply was constructed from average water supply cost data from 18 projects in the Western United States [Wahl (1985) 24 We assume a field efficiency of 0.9, i.e., only 10 percent of the water allotted to the firm is lost through leakage etc. 25 These numbers for construction costs, although somewhat dated, do not change appreciably over time. Even if they did, it is not the level of costs but the variation across alternative regimes which is important for our comparisons. We also perform sensitivity analysis with higher distribution costs, see below. 26 The exact loss coefficient, however, would depend on environmental factors such as soil characteristics, ambient ($102.76 to $238.16 /acre-foot) for the various models analyzed (see Table 2 ). For computational purposes, the water district is assumed to be of constant width (18), and (17) gives (6) and (7) So, the monopolist is assumed to engage in perfect price discrimination, charging price c w p at which each firm exactly covers its total cost and makes zero profit. This pricing mechanism will not change any of the institutional comparisons developed earlier, since the quantity of water allocated at each location is still the same.
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Simulation Results
The institutional differences are evaluated when demand for the end-use becomes more elastic, which may be representative of water use in another region or an end-use with different production characteristics, see Table 2 and Figs. 4 and 5. Welfare effects are obviously highest under a social planner, but are closely followed by the producer cartel and the water users association. 27 The distribution monopoly yields the lowest total welfare in all four cases.
Looking at the components of social welfare, surplus from water generation is maximized under the water users association, while distribution surplus peaks when there is a distribution monopoly. The generation surplus is also high under social planning, mainly because of the large quantity of aggregate water used, which creates a cost surplus over the intra-marginal units. The distribution monopoly uses nearly half the water under social planning, but covers nearly the same area when elasticity is low (-2). This is because the former allocates low volumes of water at each location. If land availability is an issue, then this regime may not be the appropriate institutional choice. Except for the distribution monopoly, water use at each location is quite homogenous across all regimes.
As output demand becomes more elastic, the producer cartel increases output and reduces commodity prices, while both price and output for the CID decline. Aggregate welfare is always higher under a producer cartel than for CID. With increasing demand elasticity, the cartel covers a larger area and uses more water in the aggregate. The cartel always generates higher social welfare than the WUA, and performs almost like the social planner when elasticity is high (-4).
In this case, a cartel may produce greater output than the WUA. Therefore, for high elasticity in 27 Aggregate welfare for the social planner is decomposed into consumer surplus given by
and aggregate producer surplus into three individual components:
i.e., the aggregate surplus accruing to producing firms, the distribution authority and the generator, shown in brackets. These expressions can be modified appropriately for the other regimes. The models were also run for unit demand elasticity, and the general differences preserved.
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the end-use market (e.g., production for export), the producer cartel may be a preferred alternative not only from a welfare consideration but also in terms of aggregate output.
The distribution monopoly and the CID model are consistently the weak performers, even in the high elasticity case (-4). However, the CID regime always performs better of the two. This suggests that poor distribution may be preferred to monopoly power in distribution. Water in the CID regime is relatively expensive since transmission losses are high. Thus, the equilibrium price of the end-use commodity is high, and at higher demand elasticities, consumer surplus declines rapidly. As demand becomes more elastic, the underperformance of both these regimes is more pronounced.
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It is likely that higher water prices under a distribution monopoly will lead to increased conservation through use of more efficient technology, not modeled in this paper. This may lead to more efficient use of water. Water prices are also high for the social planner because of the higher marginal cost associated with aggregate water generation. However, if the goal is to connect more consumers to the grid, the distribution monopoly with its superior geographical reach may be preferred.
End-use commodity prices are always highest in the CID regime. Any institutional reform is likely to reduce commodity prices, because of the resulting investment in distribution.
Privatization for example, mostly results in an increase in water prices, because ex-ante, water prices are lower than the true marginal cost because of policy distortions. Moving from the CID to any of the regimes with distribution investments significantly increases (by as much as 70-80%) the efficiency of water use as measured by output per unit water generated. In general, consumer surplus also increases significantly from reform, even though the move to a distribution monopoly generates the smallest gain.
29 28 If water prices were based on average costs in the CID case, it may underperform relative to the distribution monopoly. Trading of water rights even with competitive distribution improves CID resource allocation. 29 We have performed sensitivity analysis with an outward shift in demand which may represent changing demand conditions over time, and with an increase in the cost of water generation and distribution. The order of performance is generally preserved. The effect of increases in generation and distribution costs is to shift up the supply curve which in turn means a higher output price. The WUA is most impacted because with an increase in the
Design of Appropriate Regulatory Policies
It may be useful to discuss the type of regulatory policies that can be adopted to achieve second best outcomes. For example, it is unreasonable to expect that the canal operator will not have full monopoly power and may be subject to some form of price cap or rate of return regulation. For example, the government may specify a fixed water price plus a conveyance fee that the DM can charge to customers. Investment in distribution by the DM will then depend upon how this fee is specified. Given that each consumer may be charged a different price because of location, the regulation may be related to an average price. Alternatively, rate of return regulation that guarantees the monopoly a designated rate of return on investment may lead to overinvestment in conveyance, which given the rapid decline in marginal benefits from distribution, will lead to a misallocation of resources. Because investment in distribution is observable at low cost, rate of return regulation may be feasible, especially if the contract period is sufficiently large so that the distribution monopoly can recoup costs. It is easy to make prices contingent on investment in assets rather than unverifiable expenditures or investment in less useful assets (such as higher salaries and perks). In the case of water distribution, yardstick regulation could apply, in which case price is set equal to the average cost of comparable utilities. Since water generation is often local or regional and distribution is costly, comparable facilities may be easily identified, especially in other commodities with significant distribution costs such as electricity.
Rate of return regulation applied to a monopoly generator of water is likely to increase water generation, and thus lead to a bigger service area and lower output prices, whatever the market structure in the downstream end. In comparison to monopoly power in distribution, this latter policy option may generate higher benefits. Regulation of a generation monopsony may involve legislating long term contracts so that frequent hold-up problems do not occur. Another option both in generation and distribution may be to auction off franchises that transfer ownership of the assets for a limited period of time, sufficiently long to induce firm investment.
cost of water generation, there is a 30% decline in aggregate water use. Increased distribution costs affect the optimal model the most by reducing aggregate water use and service area. The complete sensitivity analysis results are available separately from the authors.
Since investments in water distribution have a relatively long life, it is important to discuss how the alternative regimes may compare in a dynamic context. Without explicitly developing a dynamic model, it may be useful to make some informed speculation based on the static results above (see also Chakravorty and Umetsu (2003) ). One important reason for preferring the CID regime over the DM is in settings where the lost water can be reused at relatively low cost. The consideration of these third party effects may make CID the preferred arrangement, even though DM is the dominant regime for the project in question. If the demand for water were to increase in the future, then the value of this externality will also increase, and CID may dominate even more. A dynamic model may also be able to capture the opportunity rent of land, which may change exogenously. For example, an increasing land rent function (say in alternative uses) will imply that over time, the system may shrink, possibly after the DM has upgraded the system. In this case, the monopolist may not be able to recoup their sunk costs. These dynamic issues may need to be considered during ex ante contracting.
Concluding Remarks
The production of water has often been viewed as one monolithic entity. The standard recommendation made is that the introduction of water markets leads to efficiency. However, increasing returns to scale in water distribution suggests that a water market will not lead to optimal resource allocation. Improving water management may mean a variety of alternative institutional choices. This paper shows that the choice of an institutional regime, in turn, may depend upon the characteristics of the microstructure of the water market. The analysis is relevant for the delivery of any infrastructure service (water, sanitation, electricity, natural gas, etc.) that entails significant distribution costs.
The paper yields insights into which institutional alternatives may be appropriate in a given situation. For example, when generation of the service is relatively elastic, a users association with market power in generation may perform closer to the optimal solution. On the other hand, elastic demand for the final product may indicate that a cartel or cooperative with market power in the output market may be preferred to the status quo. Similarly in locations where the scale of the service is important, a distribution monopoly may ensure delivery over a relatively large 23 service area, even though it performs poorly according to conventional welfare measures.
Monopoly power in distribution may also induce private conservation. Often a competitive distribution mechanism characterized by market failure may be preferred to a monopoly in distribution.
The empirical model shows that institutions may have differential impacts upon the geography of the region. Moving from competition to a distribution monopoly may mean that the service area may expand significantly, yet output may increase only marginally and welfare may fall.
Maximizing the number of beneficiaries and maximizing welfare may be divergent goals. The distribution monopoly always maximizes the extensive margin yet performs poorly in the aggregate welfare and production measures. Relative to competition, a privatized regime with market power in the input or output market is always Pareto-improving. This suggests that laws that support water users associations or provide anti-trust exemption to output cartels may generate ancillary benefits in terms of mitigating problems associated with natural monopolies.
A major assumption of the model is that the water lost cannot be retrieved elsewhere. The value of this externality may depend on specific factors such as pumping costs. These considerations should improve the performance of the CID regime. The dynamics of water use and its possible treatment as a renewable or a nonrenewable resource (e.g., groundwater) may also complicate the analysis. Multiple uses of water as in power generation and hydroelectricity under imperfect competition could also be considered in future work [Crampes and Moreaux (2001) ]. 
, we have
, i.e., the CID marginal cost of water generation is greater than optimal.
We can write the identity dY
and sub-optimal distribution investment implies more water is required to produce incremental output in the CID case, i.e.,
. Finally, the slope of the unconstrained marginal cost function must be lower than the slope of the constrained marginal cost function since the former is an envelope of the latter [Silberberg (1990, p. 254) ]. The proof of the other two cases is similar. (c) The relation dY 
which is a contradiction. Hence 
=
. Thus, the cartel can mimic the CID allocation of resources by transferring production from area U to area V, and save on distribution losses since V is closer to the source. The last inequality implies that this rearrangement is feasible.
Thus the cartel is not efficient to begin with, which is a contradiction. So, 
